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In his book “Galileo’s Error”, Philip Goff lays out what he calls “foundations for a new science of 
consciousness”, which are decidedly anti-physicalist (panpsychist), motivated by a critique of Galileo’s 
distinction into knowable objective and unknowable subjective properties and Arthur Eddington’s argument 
for the limitation of purely structural (physical) knowledge. 
Here we outline an alternative theory, premised on the Interface Theory of Perception, that too subscribes 
to a “post-Galilean” research programme. However, interface theorists disagree along several lines. 1. They 
note that Galileo’s distinction should be replaced by a truly non-dual account, referring to a difference of 
degree only. 2. They highly appreciate the role of mathematics, in particular when it comes to actually 
engaging scientifically with consciousness. 
Some notable features of the interface theory are its skepticism towards our epistemic capacities and its 
rejection of the existence of a public, mind-independent reality. In addition, some interface theorists further 
employ a thin concept of “conscious agency” to ground their theory. 
The interface theory leaves open many of the problems of consciousness science (e.g. what is a “self”?) as 






Being a non-dualist is hard. Really hard. On the surface, it appears that simply rejecting the distinction into 
the categories of “mind” and “matter” suffices for being a non-dualist. But this is not the whole story. Most 
often, what happens is that dualisms of some sort are smuggled into one’s theory through the backdoor. 
Daniel Dennett famously declared people who reformulated Cartesian assumptions within a materialistic 
theory (e.g. that “consciousness” is to be found in a single unified center of physical processing) to be 
“Cartesian materialists” (Dennett 1991). Philip Goff, on the other hand, calls for a “post-Galilean science 
of consciousness” that rests on the assumptions of “realism about consciousness”, “empiricism”, and “non-
dualism” (p. 174)2. We applaud Goff for this bold declaration. 
 
Yet, the devil is in the details. For example, his clear-cut distinction into categorical (“intrinsic”) and 
dispositional (“structural”) might seem to be just a “dualism in disguise”.3 A lot of this is motivated by an 
“error” made by Galileo Galilei who distinguished between the mathematically describable properties of 
public physical objects and the subjective properties of consciousness. This might seem as an act of 
ignorance on the part of Galileo. However, one of the main reasons that science has been so successful is 
precisely because it excluded conscious experience right from the start. 
 
But what to do if the goal is now to construct a science of consciousness? We appreciate the point made by 
Arthur Eddington and others that physical knowledge is ultimately only about the relation of pointer 
readings. This kind of knowledge is incomplete and leaves out any knowledge about the intrinsic nature of 
things. Goff’s suggestion: “Plug the hole with consciousness” (p. 132). 
 
However, if one wants to stick to a truly non-dual solution, then adopting something similar to the following 
might be helpful (if not necessary). We would like to regard both types of statements, the ones about public 













physical4 objects and the ones about the subjective properties of consciousness to differ by degree and not 
category. Another, related, issue pertains to the role of mathematics for the science of consciousness – and 
we explicitly encourage the use of mathematics to study consciousness, rather than pointing to its 
limitations. True enough, mathematical knowledge might be incomplete in the sense that it only ever 
captures mere structure. However, we claim that it is precisely mathematics that lets us understand how 
some (apparently) “objective” structures could have emerged in the first place.5 
 
The Interface Theory of Perception 
The account discussed here is premised on the idea that we have limited insight into the “true nature of 
reality”, eventually tearing down the categorical wall that separates “mind” from “matter”. We believe that 
some of the crucial questions that we encounter along the way could be answered with the help of 
mathematical concepts such as “structure preserving maps”, “information geometry”, or “higher 
categories”. It is out of the scope of this brief discussion to work out an answer to any of these questions. 
Still, we hope to invoke a sense of urgency to deal with them but also the conviction that this can be done 
in principle. 
 
One defining property of consciousness expresses an epistemic limitation: facts about consciousness are 
accessible (at least in part) only from what is called a “first-person perspective” (Chalmers 2004). No 
amount of scientific, objective knowledge seems to make it intelligible why experience appears to have 
certain properties (e.g. qualia) that we at tribute to them based on this first-person perspective. Goff (p. 69ff) 
makes us aware of this when discussing Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument (Jackson 1982, 1986). 
Whether or not one agrees with any ontological conclusion drawn from this, it poses some interesting 
epistemic challenges. 
 
The first-person-perspective has been subject to a lot of controversy, with some people shedding doubt on 
the coherence of the very concept of unmediated forms of knowledge (or “givens”) derivable from it (e.g. 
Sellars 1963, Dennett 1991, Metzinger 2003, Prentner 2019). Recently, there has been much interest in the 
question how a creature (or: its brain) comes up with a model of itself (Metzinger 2003). Some people have 








even speculated that this could explain how consciousness is nothing but the brain’s self-attribution of a 
private inner-life (Graziano & Kastner 2011, Frankish 2017). By contrast, less attention has been directed 
to the complementary question of how a creature comes up with a model of its world, thereby attributing a 
public, physical existence to it. The catch is that such a model would not need to resemble the “objective” 
state of the world. It would not even need to explicitly encode a specific worldly state.6 Basic evolutionary 
thinking merely tells us that all a creature must do is to act successfully in its world, and its internal 
(cognitive) architecture must be such that this is possible (Mark et al. 2010, Hoffman et al. 2015a, Guez et 
al. 2019, Prakash et al. 2020, in press) – metaphorically speaking: it needs to have an interface that lets it 
deal with its world. Truthful representation takes the backseat. 
 
We are nothing but such creatures. There are two consequences of this if one is willing to think it through 
radically. First, it extends to empirical knowledge as such, dispensing with the availability of a physical 
“ground truth”: space-time is the species-specific data format of our interface (Hoffman et al. 2015a), 
objects are error-corrected representations of fitness consequences (Fields et al. 2017), and even quantum 
mechanics ultimately plays out on this interface (Prakash 2019). Second, there is no in-principle distinction 
between “public” and “private” forms of knowledge, since both refer to procedures relative to our interface. 
 
What is left might be a mere collection of processes that relate perceptions to actions. This additional claim 
seems quite natural, since it is premised on the assumption that we all have experience and (try to) do 
something about it – arguably, nothing could be more basic than that. Since this basic assumption has an 
active connotation where perceptions have (often unintended) consequences, one might refer to these 
processes as “agents”7 (Hoffman & Prakash 2014, Fields et al. 2017). The main task is then to show how 
one could recover the appearance of a public, physical world (inhabited by non-physical selves) from 
interactions between such agents.8 
  









What is ‘really real’? 
 
Imagine you are immersed in a virtual reality version of Grand Theft Auto (GTA). You are interacting with 
computer-generated content such as steering wheels, cars, policemen, and pedestrians. There is an “external 
reality”, namely the computer that governs the objects that you see, but its description does not involve 
steering wheels, cars, policemen, or pedestrians. Trying to understand the behaviour of the computer (its 
program) using these categories would be foolish. Lines of computer code do not resemble steering wheels. 
You cannot even rely on causality. Intervening with the steering wheel might have the observable 
consequence of driving into a wall (all other things being equal), but steering wheels do not cause crashes 
in GTA, the program does. Perhaps you still think that using steering wheels and other types of interventions 
lets you figure out what program the computer is running. Good luck. 
 
Moreover, GTA employs algorithms (a so-called “physics-engine”) that simulate the realistic behaviour of 
objects, even those you do not interact with. For example, objects that land in water will create ripples and 
wave patterns in response. Whether you are successful at the game has nothing to do with your grasp of the 
nature of these underlying mechanisms but only with your ability to manipulate virtual contents in a way 
that lets you score points. 
 
Is simulated physics unreal? What is “really real”? And how could we find out? Rather than pondering the 
true nature of this external reality (Is it physical? Is it a mere simulation by a highly-evolved alien species? 
Has it something to do with consciousness?), it might initially be a better strategy to ask about the principles 
and mechanisms underlying its appearance as being stable (steering wheels generally do not turn into gear 
shifters), consistent (killing pedestrians leads to being chased by policemen), and law-like (objects that fall 
into water create ripples) – properties we typically attribute to the world around us. Philosophically 
speaking, we have shifted from a transcendent question about the nature of reality to a transcendental one 
about the conditions of possibility of its experience (Kant 1998). 
 
Of course, computer games and virtual reality simulations are not the real world, and the metaphor above 
breaks down eventually. In the following, we therefore wish to translate the question about its appearance 
into the language of the interface theory of perception. This will intentionally be done non-mathematically.9 
 
                                                        
9 The	interested	reader	is	referred	to	(Hoffman	et	al.	2015a)	for	mathematical	details.	 
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The interface theory assumes a mapping P from an external world (the computer running the program) to 
the contents of our perceptions that comprise steering wheels and pedestrians. Likewise, when we see 
pedestrians, we can decide to turn the steering wheel to the left to avoid hitting them. Abstractly, this could 
be represented by a mapping D that connects perceptions to actions. Finally, certain actions affect (A) the 
external world of the computer and feed back into our perceptions at some later time (P′). For example, we 
might see that the steering wheel indeed moved to the left and we consequently avoided hitting the 
pedestrian. Note here that we are never in perfect control of the situation. While we can choose actions, 
those actions might or might not be successful. This is life, unfortunately. We also, strictly speaking, do not 
perceive these actions, but only their consequences at future times. Seeing the steering wheel turning left is 
a consequence of a (successful) action, it does not token the action as such. We initially did not intend to do 
a left turn, but we learned to execute actions that typically result in perceptions as of left turns. These are 
some of the basic ingredients of the theory – in a nutshell: an agent’s perception is the representation of its 
external world, based on the consequences of past actions. A “decision-process” mediates between 
perceptions and actions and could incorporate, in more sophisticated settings, things like memory, goals, or 
predictions. 
 
An interesting question is now: What properties do these structures need to have in order to guarantee future 
perceptions to appear as if they were consistent with a representation of an objective world? Possible 
answers would specify the types of mappings and representations that make good interfaces. They would 
be specifications about mathematical entities, for example: 
 
• Stability. The mapping from this world to our experience is relatively stable, although the 
mapping need not be structure-preserving in any substantial sense.10 Otherwise we were not able 
to do anything useful. In particular, a system would not be able to decide on any given course of 
action (if steering wheels might suddenly turn into gear shifters, then there is no point in deciding 
to turn the wheel to the left, cf. Durham (2020)). 
 
• Consistency. This is about action-consequences, and how they feed back into future perceptions. 
Future perceptions should be consistent with the actions an agent previously took (modulo the 
uncertainty whether they succeeded or not). But not all our actions have an effect, and not all 
effects we perceive are due to our actions. Thus, we also need to ensure: 
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• Law-like behavior. Things that cannot be subjectively influenced should enter in a “nice” 
(predictable) way into our experience. This does not mean that just because we could predict 
something, there exists some objective (i.e. agent-independent) law that governs its behavior. 
There can be “laws without laws”, based on predictability (Müller 2020). 
 
More refined models will likely capture some structural aspects of our perceptual interface, and 
will extend them using symmetry considerations (e.g. we perceive space as locally Euclidean; 
using translation invariance, we end up with a Euclidean model of space). 
 
How do agents agree? 
 
So far, the discussion mainly centred around the appearance of regularities (stability, consistency, law-
likeness), discussed against the background of a single agent that perceives, decides, and acts. 
 
An entirely different question pertains to the coordination of the actions of a collection of agents. If we go 
back to the GTA metaphor, we now look at multiplayer games. (This is unlike the situation where, say, 
policemen resembled mere icons on our interfaces.) What makes coordination possible? Answering this 
question by postulating public physical objects, while intuitive, is explanatorily lazy. This would not answer 
the question, for example, in terms of a mechanism that guarantees (perhaps surprisingly) inter-agent 
agreement. Instead it would refer to an underlying agent-independent reality that is somehow mirrored in 
the agents’ experiences and serves as a common point of reference. 
 
A motivating example is given by synesthesia. Synesthetes can have vastly different experiences compared 
to “normal” people when encountering the same stimuli. For example, whereas I hear a middle C, a 
synesthete might see, in addition, the colour blue. In the language of the interface theory, the mapping from 
the external world goes to very different perceptions. 
 
An interesting question is: How different can such mappings be and still allow meaningful interaction 
between agents? Does this, for example, require a homomorphism between their two interfaces? Can we 
articulate a more refined or weaker constraint in information- theoretic terms (e.g. based on mutual 
information)? Could we use the category-theoretical tool of a 2-morphism, that is, a morphism that exists 
between morphisms (e.g. Dobson & Prentner 2021), letting go of the assumption that there is a single same 
world underlying the agents’ experience? 
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Finally, we would not only want to compare the experiences of two (or more) interacting agents, but also 
ask about the status of the universe that the two observers inhabit. One famous argument in the philosophy 
of science proceeds via scrutinizing our knowledge (Putnam 1975). In particular, it suggests that the success 
of science is best explained by the idea that scientific knowledge in fact mirrors (to some extent) an agent-
independent reality (Sokal & Bricmont 1998, p.57): 
 
The main reason for believing scientific theories (at least the best-verified ones) is that [...] it would 
be a miracle if science said nothing true – or at least approximately true – about the world. The 
experimental confirmations of the best-established scientific theories, taken together, are evidence 
that we really have acquired an objective (albeit approximate and incomplete) knowledge of the 
natural world. 
 
A possible counter to this argument for “scientific realism” revolves around the notion of “success” and its 
relativity (Feyerabend 1975). Another counter would grant science its success but rejects the claim that one 
therefore needs to accept that our theories somehow depict an agent-independent world – or at least that this 
would be the best explanation for science’s success. Again, the assumption of unguarded (naive) realism 
strikes us as explanatorily lazy. 
 
Of course, the philosophical literature on this is huge, and we have to limit ourselves to emphasizing certain 
key points. Typically, our best scientific theories are being evaluated against the results of measurements 
that single out the “best-verified ones” (using the terminology from above). As such, the most pressing 
questions will pertain to measurements and how measurements between different agents are related to each 
other. As a caveat, note that one might wish to limit oneself to the situation where some (perhaps 
evolutionary formulated) criteria of success are assumed,11 rather than spelling out an account of what 
amounts to “acting successfully” – one simply stipulates that there are success criteria and that agents get 
feedback on whether or not they are met. Any successful interaction between agents would be reinforced, so 
as to produce stable, seemingly objective structures. While it is highly unlikely, following the interface 
theory, that such structures would correspond to anything “out there”, a certain subset could give the 
appearance of a stable backdrop for successful “measurements” (i.e. repeatable, quantifiable, comparable, 
and consistent interactions). 
 
                                                        
11 This	renders	this	stance	somewhat	close	to	pragmatism,	taking	the	notion	of	a	“successful	interaction”	as	primitive.	 
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This raises many open and potentially fruitful questions for the science of consciousness: How do agents 
decide they are both looking “at the same thing”? How do they agree on any particular “measurement unit” 
like a yard-stick? What makes the measurements replicable when conducted by different observers at 
different times? On the face of it, this suggests that “the thing being measured” is the same for all observers, 
and that “the measurement unit” and “the measurement procedure” are the same for all observers at all times. 
But is this really the case? How can it be justified? Yet it seems that the concepts involved can be 
meaningfully translated into mathematical language. For example, replicability might be taken as the 




We have speculated on necessary structural properties of procedures, understood as a sequence of 
perceptions and actions, relative to interfaces, which could give rise to regularities within and between agents 
– regularities that might ground measurements and perhaps even the appearance of an agent-independent, 
public world. However, we have said nothing about “qualia” or “what-it-is-like” to be such an agent. Since 
these properties take a central role in Goff’s metaphysics, we would like to finally address them. 
 
For example, it has been proposed that the basic ingredients of the universe are “conscious agents”, for which 
going through sequences of perception and action comes with a distinct raw feeling – it is something like to 
be such an agent (Hoffman & Prakash 2014, Fields et al. 2018). Yet, one might wish to exactly state what 
properties typically attributed to consciousness could be recovered from such a description (Kleiner 2020). 
If one is convinced that any property of consciousness (save a basic “what-it-is-likeness” which is stipulated 
to begin with) could be recovered from a dynamical system of such agents, this gives rise to the following 
recipe: 
 
1. Identify the particular property and formalize it 
2. Show how it could be recovered from the dynamics (of a network) of such agents. 
 
That such a reconstruction is indeed possible has been conjectured in the form of a “conscious agent thesis” 
(Hoffman & Prakash 2014). It is the truth of this conjecture that turns the minimal concept of a “conscious 
agent” into a full-blown description of (typically human) consciousness. This leaves open many questions 
as to what those properties are (e.g. “selfhood”), what the explananda precisely look like (e.g. how 




“selfhood” could be formalized), and what their explanations would be (e.g. relatively stable configurations 
of entangled agents that share a common history). We do not see how progress on such problems could be 
made without mathematics. 
 
Finally, connecting back to the original distinction of Galileo, let us briefly sketch some alternative positions: 
1) Subjective and objective properties are somehow completely different. This is the option that Galileo 
preferred, but seemingly also Goff when he distinguishes categorically between “intrinsic natures” and 
structural properties. Both Galileio’s materialism and Goff’s panpsychism seem to presuppose a shared, 
objective world. 2) There is only individual subjective experience and no shared world at all. This is the 
position that is traditionally associated with solipsism. 3) A position that would sit somewhere in between, 
where there are only the distinct interfaces of individual agents as well as something that is shared. This 
something is arbitrarily different from what is displayed on any of the interfaces, but it would not exist in 
the absence of agents. 
 
Why should one adopt the latter position? First, it is explicitly non-dual. Whether or not this is really 
warranted, panpsychists often receive backlash from people who see in panpsychism a way of “injecting” 
phenomenal properties into physical objects that leads to statements about conscious tables and chairs. 
Interface theorists arguably do not fall prey to this charge. There is no question of whether matter is 
“intrinsically” conscious, since material objects are icons on interfaces. An icon is not conscious, and it does 
not exist in the absence of agents. Second, and more importantly, it stays close to the conventional scientific 
(mathematical) method: identify a theoretical primitive, give a mathematical description of it (to the extent 
possible), and derive stuff from there.13 One of the largest open problems for panpsychism is to explain not 
just “any old conscious experience” but “our conscious experience” (Goff 2009). The interface theory 
promises to tackle this problem.14 
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